image-mouvement
The movement-image is a regime in which movement differentiates into perception, affection, impulse, action, reflection, and mental relation to organize the image directly, while time appears indirectly through movement and montage. The relation-image is a decisive realization within the mental-image's problem-field, not an additional source-level rank parallel to it, and films need not pass through one fixed action-chain.
A question for the shotWhich differentiation—perception, affection, impulse, action, reflection, or mental relation—governs the shot, and how does it alter connections among parts so that the whole changes qualitatively?
Cinema 1; Cinema 2, ch. 1–2
image-pulsion
The impulse-image stands between affection and action. Deleuze divides its naturalist structure into four terms arranged in two pairs: originary world/derived milieu and elementary impulse/real behaviour. A historically, geographically, and socially determinate derived milieu remains present while elementary impulse penetrates real behaviour from within; impulse seizes object-fragments from that milieu and thereby exposes an uncoordinated originary world. Symptom and fetish are not additional structural terms but two classes of signs: a symptom is the appearance of impulse in the derived milieu, while a fetish is the appearance of the seized object-fragment itself. Stroheim realizes this structure through decay, descent, and entropy; Buñuel through repetition, cycles, and restart. These are distinct realizations, not cumulative thresholds that every example must satisfy.
A question for the shotWithin a specific shot, first distinguish how the four-part structure operates: how an originary world appears within a derived milieu, and how elementary impulse penetrates real behaviour while seizing object-fragments. Then identify which of the two types of signs makes this operation visible—a symptom, or a fetish as the appearance of an object-fragment—before determining whether the film follows Stroheimian descent/entropy, Buñuelian repetition/cycle, or another demonstrable realization.
Cinema 1, ch. 8, pp. 123–140 (Minnesota 1986)
grande forme de l'image-action
The large form of the action-image follows S–A–S′. A milieu, collective, historical pressure, or danger first composes an encompassing situation S; that pressure leaves an internal imprint upon the character and concentrates itself in action A as effort, duel, or collective coordination; action then carries the milieu into a situation S′ different from the initial one. Its decisive question is how a situation demands action and whether action actually reorganizes that situation.
A question for the shotSpecify the encompassing pressure of S, trace how it contracts through bodies and groups into A, then compare the institutional, spatial, and force relations of S with S′. If only a task is completed while the situation remains unchanged, the circuit has not been demonstrated.
Cinema 1, ch. 9, pp. 141–159 (Minnesota 1986)
petite forme de l'image-action
The small form of the action-image follows A–S–A′. It begins from an action A already underway whose meaning remains equivocal; indices of lack or ambiguity progressively disclose the situation S in which that act is embedded, forcing a revised action A′. The situation is not given in advance as a known whole but inferred through local gestures, misrecognitions, clues, gags, and the consequences of action.
A question for the shotWhat initially unintelligible act does the shot give us? Which index of lack or equivocity makes its situation inferable, and how does that inference rewrite the next action? If the situation is fully established from the outset, A–S–A′ is not the most precise account.
Cinema 1, ch. 10, pp. 160–177 (Minnesota 1986)
image-réflexion
Following Cinema 2, pp. 32–33, which retrospectively revisits the first semiotics, the atlas gathers the figures developed in Cinema 1, chapters 10–11—attraction, inversion, and discourse—under reflection-image. All three still transform the situation–action relation from within the action forms: attraction uses a substitute or rehearsal to miniaturize, prefigure, or stage another situation or act; inversion exchanges large and small powers; discourse makes an implicit problem into an audible and visible object of thought. Reflection-image must not be prematurely equated with chapter 12's relation-image.
A question for the shotIdentify the third term introduced between situation and action, then demonstrate shot by shot whether it transforms the prior S–A or A–S direction through substitution and prefiguration, inversion of large and small powers, or discourse that makes an implicit problematic relation into the image's object.
Cinema 1, ch. 10, pp. 171–173 (discursive figure), ch. 11, pp. 182–187 (attraction and inversion) (Minnesota 1986); Cinema 2, ch. 2, pp. 32–33 (retrospective sign classification) (Minnesota 1989)
image mentale
In Cinema 1, the mental-image takes relations, symbolic acts and intellectual feelings as objects of thought rather than representing a character's inner states. Relations are external to their terms and irreducible to any single term's properties; symbolic acts and intellectual feelings must likewise become operations performed by framing, sound and editing, not merely story content. Hitchcock's relation-image is a decisive realization of this problem-field: camera and montage make the spectator's inference part of the image. The mental-image is not a parent category for recollection-images and dream-images.
A question for the shotFirst determine whether the shot takes a relation, symbolic act, or intellectual feeling as its object. Then ask how camera, editing, and sound distribute that operation among character, film, and spectator rather than merely supplying psychological information; a further diagnosis of relation-image requires separate evidence of Thirdness at work.
Cinema 1, ch. 12, pp. 197–205 (Minnesota 1986); Cinema: The Classification of Signs and Time, lecture 12, 1 March 1983
image-relation
The relation-image is a decisive realization of the mental-image's problem-field in Hitchcock: it makes relations themselves the object of the image and organizes its signs through Peircean thirdness. Marks sustain natural or habitual series; demarks divert a series through an anomalous term; symbols let concrete terms carry abstract relations. Hitchcock also forms a three-part arrangement of director, film and spectator who must enter the process of inference. Mental-image and relation-image connect in this way rather than constituting two parallel higher-order types.
A question for the shotFirst list the habitual series, then identify the demark that makes it deviate or contradict itself, or the concrete symbol that bears several relations or variations of one relation. Finally show how the film lets spectators know or discover the relation ahead of a character and incorporates that response into framing, editing, and suspense rather than merely making them wait for a solution.
Cinema 1, ch. 12, pp. 197–205 (Minnesota 1986)